For developing a better comprehension of the consequences of cyber-attacks, the paper examines the influence of system infections with self-replicating malware on the outcome of kinetic combat. The situation is represented as a system-dynamics model consisting of a SIRlike and a Lanchester component. The game-like context of kinetic combat illustrates the effects of malware in a concise way. Corresponding assessment criteria are derived and applied to scenario classes resulting from assumptions about the expected circumstances. Remaining uncertainties are taken into account by applying Monte-Carlo simulations, whereby the specific scenarios to be processed can be selected randomly by information-theoretic principles. The resulting framework allows a model-based calculation of e.g. the risk and the fraction of scenarios, in which malware attacks turn around the outcome of the kinetic combat. Some of our basic findings derived from computational calculations are: (1) Malware attacks affecting availability can turn around the outcome of kinetic combat in a significant fraction of scenarios. (2) Cyber capabilities tend to soften out kinetic superiority or inferiority. (3) Using the most aggressive malware is not necessarily the best decision for an aggressor. (4) Starting countermeasures against a malware attack at the earliest possible time is not always the best decision for a defender. arXiv:1811.01892v1 [cs.CR] 5 Nov 2018 for a Lanchester model of kinetic combat as exemplary system affected by malware, whereby the propagation of malware across the system is represented by a SIR-like model. The Lanchester model was chosen mainly due to its simplicity, which may enable a more direct insight into the interactions between availability and malware. Additionally, the game character of the Lanchester model immediately provides an evaluation measure of the outcome of a specific situation. Several papers are considering co-occurring kinetic combat and cyber warfare with malware. Mishra and Prajapati discuss in their paper [21] cyber warfare based on a differential equation system as well, but they do not take availability aspects into account; instead, they focus on a stability analysis. McMorrow [18] defines the transfer of findings provided by biological epidemics to the cyber domain as one of the objectives for the development of a deeper understanding of large scale cyber attacks. Schramm [24] has developed a corresponding model combining a kinetic battle situation with a one-sided malware attack based on the SIR model [12] . Its symmetrization by Yildiz [31] assures that both forces have the same capabilities and vulnerabilities. Both [30] and [31] examine and expand the models of Schramm. Our paper contributes to the existig literature by analyzing various scenario classes characterized by corresponding assumptions and uncertainties using Monte-Carlo simulations. It is structured as follows. The Lanchester/SIR model used for our discussion of malware effects is described in section 2. The settings of analysis, which includes the parameters of the model and the evaluation measures, is introduced and discussed in section 3. In section 4, the evaluation measures are applied to the Lanchester/SIR-model of section 2. A discussion of the results is included. The paper closes with an outlook in section 5, which summarizes the results, points to some advanced aspects, and which presents open questions.
Introduction
Among all the threats related to cyber security, self-replicating malware like viruses or worms are some of the most important ones. Due to the capability of self-reproduction, the infection of a single unimportant system component may cause catastrophic damage to the overall systemmaybe even a complete state -in the final outcome. This disproportionality between the low effort and the potentially significant damage qualifies the usage of malware for large scale attacks and cyber warfare [10, 22] . Indeed, the Cyber Conflict Studies Association CCSA 1 lists numerous incidents at nation level. We give some examples: In 1998, the NATO attacked infrastructure and command & control structures in Serbia during the Kosovo war with self-replicating malware [9] , enabling an especially successful air campaign. In April 2007, Estonia was attacked at cyber level, presumably by Russia [3] . The attack has targeted ministries, banks, and media and caused injuries due to riots resulting from the effectiveness of the attack. Trojans have enforced a temporary shutdown of the computer network of the German Bundestag in 2015 [17, 25] . More examples can be found in [4, 8, 14, 23] . Despite of all these incidents, the knowledge about mechanisms and consequences of such large scale attacks still seem to be insufficient. One reason may be that malware infections are typically discussed from the IT security perspective alone. Such considerations neglect the effects of a malware infection, however. In an embedded system containing several computers as subsystems, each computer may provide specific functionalities of the overall system. A malware infection of a specific computer may also affect specific functionalities. Only if the (non-)availability of functionalities are taken into account, the effects of malware infections can be assessed adequately. Accordingly, we have analyzed the effects of a malware infection based on a model not only representing the cyber part, but the availability as well. The reduction of the availability caused by the malware infection provides a natural loss function and allows an objective and quantitative assessment of the malware effects. This paper carries out a corresponding analysis may become patched in this way 2 . We assume that the malware propagation within a force is homogeneous and that patching of infected systems can only happen within a force. Accordingly, the equations of the basic SIR-model are defined as follows:
Concerning initial conditions, it holds S(0), I(0), R(0) ≥ 0.
Component Integration Lanchester and SIR components are integrated based on the interactions between them. The initial malware infection triggering a malware epidemics is caused by a malware attack of the vulnerable and patched systems of the adversarial force. The effect of a malware attack is a flow of rate α from vulnerable force elements to infected force elements. Though there exist a large spectrum of infection mechanism [24] , the considerations in this paper are restricted to a single generic mechanism. The kinetic effectiveness δ U of infected force elements is reduced by a factor δ I ∈ [0, 1]. It is restored to its original value after patching. The patching action can be applied to infected resp. vulnerable systems with rate γ resp. γ. Once patched, a new infection (with this specific malware) is excluded. Patching of infected systems requires an interaction with vulnerable or patched systems. Infected systems can not patch other systems or themselves. The effects of kinetic combat on force elements is independent from the malware state of these elements, i.e. vulnerable, infected, and patched systems suffer losses according to the same attrition rate; the malware state influences the capabilities of force elements as attackers, not as defenders.
The assumptions for the kinetic and cyber component and their interactions lead to the structure of the overall model as shown in figure 1 . The compartments S, I, and R already known from the SIR model were supplemented by the compartment D of destroyed force elements for bookkeeping purposes. We will now quantify the flows for the blue force; the flows for Red correspond to the flows given for the blue force due to the symmetry of the model.
• β b S b I b /N b is the flow from S b to I b due to malware infections.
• γ b S b is the flow from S b to R b representing a patching of the vulnerability before an infection occurs.
• γ b I b (S b +R b )/N b is the flow from I b to R b representing the removal of the malware infection together with a patching of the vulnerability.
Some remarks concerning the normalization have to be added. The simplicity of equation (2) results from a constant 'population' size. If concurrently to the epidemics a kinetic combat occurs inflicting losses among the force elements, a normalization of the epidemics-related interaction terms becomes necessary. This does not hold for the interaction terms related to kinetic combat and the malware attack, since here the absolute numbers are of interest. Now, the flows related to kinetic combat are discussed. Following the structure of the equation system (1) , the attrition rate of Red on Blue is δ U r (S r + R r + δ Ir I r ) p . The factor δ Ir in this term describes the reduced effectiveness of infected force elements. The affected elements of Blue are S q , I q , or R q .
• δ U r (S p r + R p r + δ Ir I p r ) · S q b is the flow from S b to D b due to kinetic combat losses. • δ U r (S p r + R p r + δ Ir I p r ) · I q b is the flow from I b to D b due to kinetic combat losses. • δ U r (S p r + R p r + δ Ir I p r ) · R q b is the flow from R b to D b due to kinetic combat losses. • α r (S r + R r ) · S b is the flow from S b to I b due to a malware attack of Red. In the end, we get four equations for each of the two forces. We only give the equations for Blue, since the equations for Red have symmetric form.
A tabular overview of the parameters contained in the equation system is given in table 1. As initial conditions, the non-negativity S(0), I(0), R(0), D(0) ≥ 0 of all compartments is required.
In the future, we will also use the designation N := S + I + R for the still existing force elements.
Model Consistency
The kinetic interaction terms like δ U r (S p r + R p r + δ Ir I p r ) · S q b require further discussion. For q → 0, one gets S q b → 1 independently of the value of S. This means, the losses inflicted on the blue force by Red becomes independent of the number of blue force elements still existing. For S b close to 0, the level of S b will thus become negative in effect. Similarly, for p → 0 the factor Timing ∆t Time difference ∆t = t mal − t kin between the start t mal of the malware attack and the start t kin of kinetic combat.
∆t ∈ R ∆t m Duration of malware attack ∆t m ≥ 0 ∆t p Time difference ∆t p = t patch −t kin between the start t patch of the patching process and the start t kin of the kinetic combat ∆t p ∈ R 
(and analogously for the other kinetic interaction terms) avoids the occurrence of compartments with negative levels but preserves the system dynamics for S b > 0 approximately. For avoiding bulky expressions, we will use the designation x a := f (x)x a . This simplifies term (4) 
If we talk about the equation system (3) in the following, we mean always the system modified by the barrier function f (x) as described above. Furthermore, the temporal derivative of a compartment level C is designated as C for short in the future.
Proposition 1 (Consistency of the Modified Equation System
Sketch of Proof. a) According to construction, S b → 0 for S b → 0 and S b ≈ S b otherwise. Corresponding statements are valid for S r , I b , I r , R b , R r . The statement is an immediate consequence. Besides of the number of vulnerable, infected, and patched elements for both forces, the overall numbers of available and destroyed force elements are shown. Due to malware attacks applied by both forces, the red force is stronger at the beginning but will still lose in the end.
b) The condition S b → 0 assures that all flow terms in the expression of S b in equations system (3) become 0; concerning the flow term representing kinetic combat, this results from part a). The claim follows for S b . The proof for S r proceeds in an analogous way. c) The assertion N r → 0 leads immediately to S r , R r , I r → 0 due to the non-negativity of the compartment levels. Thus it holds S p r + R p r + δ Ir I p r → 0 and moreover δ U r (S p
The preceeding proposition excludes the two types of unphysical behavior mentioned at the beginning of this section after introduction of the barrier function f (x). Such negativities can also be generated at the computational level. For avoiding overshooting effects leading to negative compartment levels, the size of the time steps has to be chosen small enough. A less extreme barrier function f (x) -i.e. a barrier function with a smaller exponent -may avoid negativities more reliably, but its influence on the dynamics of the system will be stronger.
Model Extensions
Since the start of cyber and kinetic warfare may not necessarily coincide, we extend the model by allowing an onset of kinetic combat, malware attack and patching process independently from each other. In this way, situations like a preparation of a kinetic battle by a supporting malware attack or a late start of countermeasures due to a delayed provision of appropriate patches can be modeled. Additionally, the duration of the malware attack can be restricted by ∆t m . An early stop of the malware attack can sometimes be useful for covering up the source of the malware attack. Before the start and after the end of an action like a malware attack, the action is defined as being inactive by appropriate settings of the action parameters. Inbetween, the action parameters are set to their effective values. Details are given in Start of patching process at time t patch = t kin + ∆t p γ, γ set to (effective) parameter values 
The quantity N (t) + D(t) is constant over time. For an initial condition D(0) = 0, one gets N (0) = N (t) + D(t) for all times t.
Sketch of Proof. a) According to the structure of (3) b) Summing up N (t) + D (t) = S (t) + I (t) + R (t) + D (t) the changes for all compartments gives 0, because all terms will cancel out. Thus, N (t) + D(t) is constant over time.
Model Validation
Our strategy of model validation is oriented towards internal consistency. This takes into account that our abstract model of a kinetic combat co-occurring with malware propagation does not aim primarily at a detailed and precise representation of a real world situation, but at enabling a discussion of the fundamental phenomena of the interactions between availability of system capabilities and malware effects. Furthermore, it has to be noted that real word comparison data are not yet accessible.
The two key components of the model -the kinetic combat and the malware propagation component -are validated by comparing their behavior with very basic models of the pure Lanchester and SIR equations. In this way, the correct formulation and implementation of equation system (3) has been checked. Unused parts of (3) were switched off for the validation by appropriate parameter settings. For comparing the Lanchester part of (3) with the pure Lanchester model (1), all model parameters are set to zero resp. neutral values with exception of δ U b , δ U r , p, q. For the effectivity reduction of force elements due to malware infections, we have chosen δ Ib , δ Ir = 1. For executing a cross-validation of the cyber warfare component, the model parameters are set to neutral values with exception of β, γ, γ . Especially, it holds δ U b , δ U r , α b , α r = 0. Furthermore, we will limit our considerations to Blue due to the symmetry of (3) according to proposition 2.a). This leads to the following comparison model.
This equation system differs from common SIR-models with biological origin by an unusual 'recovery' term
For the cross-validation, we will use the initial conditions
is a consequence of the missing option of a malware attack; thus, we have to start with a non-zero fraction of infections. Applying a pre-implemented ODE solver for the comparison models validates also the Euler method used as solution algorithm for (3) . The existence of events changing parameter values discontinuously makes it advantageous to use a simple explicit solution method.
Additionally, the overall model and thus the interactions between the two main components was examined by face-validation. Besides of the plausibility of the effects of parameter changes, checks of the reproducibility of constraints like the conservation of the overall number N b (t) + D b (t) resp. N r (t) + D r (t) of force elements or the monotonic decrease of existing force elements N b (t) resp. N r (t) over time were executed.
Simulation Designs and Observables

Design and Outcome Space
In order to analyze the behavior of the system (3), simulation experiments are executed for specific scenarios x ∈ X. The space X = × i X i of scenarios is composed of the admissible domains X i of the parameters and of the initial conditions of the model. In the following, the component X i associated with, say, the malware attack rate α b of Blue is designated as
The set X is also called design space.
A specific scenario x ∈ X provides the input for the simulation. Executing the simulation sim : X → Y establishes an input/outcome relation by assigning an outcome y ∈ Y to the input x. The space Y = (R + 0 → R + 0 ) 8 of simulation outcomes records the dynamics of the model (3) as the time-dependent variations of the levels of all eight compartments. Thus, an outcome y ∈ Y has the form
From Trajectories to Scalar Observables
The components of the outcome space Y consist of time-dependent trajectories of infinite length. For such function spaces usually no canonical ordering '<' exist, which is a serious obstacle for comparing scenario outcomes. Without a canonical ordering relation, it is hard to justify why an outcome y is considered as better than an outcome y . An option of reducing the time-dependent trajectories to single scalar values would be helpful in this respect. The following proposition improves the situation. Sketch of Proof. In the following, we assume w.l.o.g. that all events have already been processed, i.e. that no model parameters will change anymore in the simulation run. Since the compartment S has no inflow, the level of S is monotonically decreasing. According to S < 0 -derivable directly from (3) -the decrease of S (t) is monotonic as well; thus, an already small flow rate can not increase again. Due to the monotonic decrease of S(t) and S (t) on the one hand and the limitation given by S(t) ≥ 0 on the other, the decrease must be fading out. We can state ∀ε > 0 ∃t ≥ 0 ∀t > t : |S (t)| < ε. This proves the claim S → 0. Concerning the claim D → 0, an analogous reasoning can be made. Here, the compartment D has no outflow leading to a monotonic decrease of D(t) and D (t). The claim holds, because D(t) is limited from above according to D(t) ≤ S(0) = N (0) because of proposition 2.b). The statement S → 0 means according to the flows shown in figure 1 that for t > t , there is no significant inflow to the compartment I anymore. From this time on, the compartment level of I will change significantly only due to an eventual outflow. We can argue again analogously to S and D and state that I(t) and I (t) is monotonically decreasing. Consequently, ∀ε > 0 ∃t > t ∀t > t : |I (t)| < ε. This proves I → 0 as well. Finally, we make use of the preservation of N (t) + D(t) = S(t) + I(t) + R(t) + D(t) over time according to proposition 2.b). Since we have already shown S , I , D → 0, we get R → 0 as well.
Proposition 3 means that the dynamics of (3) is fading for t → ∞. This justifies in effect to interpret the valuesC := lim t→∞ C(t), C ∈ {S b , I b , R b , D b , S r , I r , R r , D r } of the compartment levels at infinity as 'result' of the simulation. Due toC ∈ R, a canonical total ordering '<' is available for assessment purposes then. Additionally, a fading dynamics is established as a plausible stop criterion, because afterwards no significant changes of the compartment levels will occur anymore and the state of the system at this time is approximately equal to its state at infinity. Accordingly, the stop is triggered if all compartments
The end time of the simulation given by the stopping criterion is designated as t end . For assuring that all temporal events are already processed -they may trigger a fundamental change of the situation -we start to check this criterion after processing all events, i.e. only for t > t kin , t mal +∆t m , t patch . This approach will work of course only as intended, if ∆t D is chosen sufficiently large and ε sufficiently small. Unfortunately, for each choice of ∆t D and of ε there exist scenarios with an arbitrary slow dynamics leading to large approximation errors, because in such cases an early stop of the simulation provides intermediate instead of 'final' results. These exceptions are considered as tolerable here, since our intention is a statistics-based analysis of the model behavior as explained later in section 3.4. A weaker analogon to proposition 3 can be used for defining the end time t kin−end of kinetic combat. We can state that an almost vanished force will not change its own size significantly anymore and will also be unable to change the size of the opposing force significantly because of its almost vanished fighting power.
Proposition 4 (Effects of a Destroyed Force). If
Proof. W.l.o.g one can assume N b → 0; otherwise change blue and red side. Since N b + D b is preserved over time according to proposition 2.b), and since N b will not significantly change anymore, D b will not change significantly either. We can thus state
In accordance with proposition 4, we define the end time t kin−end of kinetic combat based on the criterion N r (t) < ε ∨ N b (t) < ε. Of course, t kin−end and t end will not necessarily coincide, because even after annihilation of one force a malware epidemics may still be underway in the other. The application of the two criteria for triggering the stop of the simulation and for detecting the end of kinetic combat leads to the simulation algorithm 1.
Space of Observables
In the following, the assessment measures -called observables here -are defined. Since we aim at measuring the effects of a malware infection, the numbers of, say, infected or patched force elements are of minor interest only. Instead we are focusing on the eventually reduced availability of infected force elements. Accordingly, the remaining survivors N b , N r and cumulated losses D b , D r are counted at the end t = t end of the simulation. They are of interest, because force elements infected with malware may alter the course of kinetic combat due to their reduced effectiveness. Since N b (t), N r (t) are nonnegative, the relative number ∆N := N b (t end ) − N r (t end ) Algorithm 1 Simulation Algorithm 
End time of kinetic combat 6: t ← t + δt Transition to next Euler step 7: end loop 8:
End time of simulation 9: end procedure of surviving force elements seems to be a suitable assessment criterion. Correspondingly, the relative number ∆D := D b (t end )−D r (t end ) of destroyed elements at time t end can be applied. The interpretation of these relative assessment criteria is straightforward. The case ∆N > 0 indicates a win of Blue, whereas the case ∆N < 0 indicates a win of Red. A situation with ∆N = 0 could be judged as Remis. Analogously, ∆D > 0 indicates an advantage for Red, whereas ∆D < 0 indicates an advantage for Blue. Again, ∆D = 0 could be judged as Remis because the losses of both sides have the same amount. The inclusion of both ∆N and ∆D is justified, because results with e.g. ∆N > 0 and ∆D > 0 are possible due to different force sizes and force effectivenesses. The set of observables is completed with the duration ∆T := t kin−end − t kin of kinetic combat and with the absolute number L b := D b (t end ) of losses for the blue force. The observables used in this paper are listed in table 3. In the following, the set of values of an observable, say, ∆N , for a setX ⊆ X of scenarios is designated as ∆N (X).
Observables
Description Codomain Range
Relative number of existing force elements at t end
Destroyed elements of the blue force at t end Table 3 : List of the observables used for assessment purposes. In the column 'Range' the set of possible outcomes for the initial values and parameter values taken into account in this paper is given.
Important properties of the observables are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Extrema of Observables). a) Let the values of S b (0), S r (0) be given and may hold
Sketch of Proof. a) Due to the definition of ∆N and the monotonic decrease of N b , the observable ∆N can not have a value larger than N b (0). It reaches this value at the end of the simulation, if all force elements of Blue survive e.g. due to δ U r = 0 and no elements of Red survive due to δ U b > 0 and e.g. δ Ib = 1. Proposition 2.a) leads to min(∆N ) = −N r (0). Then, the corresponding statements for ∆D are a consequence of the preservation of both N b (t)+D b (t) and N r (t) + D r (t) over time according to proposition 2.b). b) Proof analogous to a) Quantitative assessments enable comparisons of scenario outcomes, but will not allow judging an outcome as especially 'good' or 'bad'. Such an absolute assessment becomes possible, however, as soon as the range of possible values of the assessment measure is known. Proposition 5 gives the ranges of ∆N , ∆D, and L b . One has to keep in mind, however, that constraints defined on the design space restrict these ranges of possible values as well.
Information-theoretic Designs
Since the details of a future malware attack are unknown, it is advisable to consider the whole spectrum X of possible scenarios instead of concentrating on a few manually selected scenarios of limited representability. In this way, a selection bias is avoided. In order to indicate the frequency of occurrences of scenarios x ∈ X, the set X is now enriched by a notion of probability p. This gives the so-called Monte-Carlo design space (X, p). The probability distribution p represents the available knowledge (and assumptions) about the actual situation -or, seen from a different point of view, the incompleteness and the imperfections of this knowledge. We have to avoid a p(x), which contains more information about the situation as actually given; thus, we choose the probability distribution p(x) with the highest entropy among all distributions fulfilling the constraints for the given situation. According to [11] , the entropy H(p) of a continuous probability distribution p is given by H(p) = − p(x) log p(x)dx. Thus, we have to maximize the entropy H(p) of p(x) under the constraint that p(x) is compatible with the existing knowledge. In this paper, we limit ourselves to range restrictions of the parameters contained in X as knowledge for reasons of simplicity. It results a uniform probability distribution p(x) [2] . Renouncing any knowledge would be a problem, because in this case the finiteness of H(p) can not be assured anymore. A complete overview of the system behavior would be provided by applying the simulation to all scenarios x ∈ X belonging to the design space X. Due to the typically infinite size of X, we are restricting ourselves to a finite subsetX ⊂ fin X of X. The setX is called a simulation design. The subsetX is selected according to the probability distribution p(x) of the Monte-Carlo design space (M, p) by executing corresponding random experiments. The restriction of X to a finite subsetX is a necessary step for computational tractability; in this respect, it is a counterpart to the restriction of the simulation runs to finite runtimes. Both measures provide computational approximations of the noncomputable exact values. The outcomes of the simulation of scenarios x ∈X are designated asỸ ⊆ Y . For monitoring the quality of the approximation, we compare the properties of the setX = × iX i , which is generated by computational means, with the corresponding exact properties of the full design (X, p). The exact values can be derived analytically. The outcomesỸ can be used for monitoring pruposes as well. Concerning the inputs x ∈X one may check for example, how far the actual statistics ofX reflects the properties of the probability distribution p. In the case of uniform distributions, the measured values mean(X i ) and σ(X i ) of the componentsX i have to be compared with the theoretically expected values mean(X) = (min(X i ) + max(X i ))/2 and σ(X) = (max(X i ) − min(X i ))/ √ 12. Concerning the outcomes, the observed maximum and minimum of the observables ∆N and ∆D over the setX of scenarios can be compared with the theoretical range of these observables predicted in proposition 5.a). This helps to supervise the realized coverage of X byX. Another monitoring option provides proposition 2.a), which makes predictions for a design space X, which is symmetric w.r.t. Blue and Red. For an uniform probability distribution p it must hold mean(∆N ) ≈ 0 and mean(∆D) ≈ 0 according to the law of large numbers. A numerical example for both inputs and outcomes is shown in figure 3.
Risk of Designs
The statistical mean of an observable is intimately related to the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of expected utility. Restricting the considerations to disadvantageous aspects leads to the notion of risk R instead to the expected utility. Formally, R is defined as the expectation value of a loss function L [1] . In our case, we naturally consider the observable L = D(t end ) of destroyed0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
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Error of min Error of max Figure 3 : Exemplary behavior of the statistical bias dependent on the number of simulation runs. Measuring statistical quantities of the simulation designX and the associated outcomes Y and comparing them with theoretical predictions for the corresponding ideal designs allow an assessment of the quality of the selectionX of scenarios. If the quality turns out to be insufficient, the size of the simulation design has to be increased accordingly. The exemplary behavior of relevant quantities defined on the input space X is shown on the left, whereas relevant quantities for the outcome space Y are shown on the right. All these quantities will have the value zero on X resp Y for a uniform probability distribution p. Concerning the input, the plot includes the difference between the measured value mean(X γ b ) and the expected value
Concerning the outcome, the plot includes mean(∆N (X)) and the difference between the measured value max(∆N (X)) resp. min(∆N (X)) and the expected maximum 1.0 resp. minimum −1.0 according to proposition 5.a).
force elements as loss value assigned to a single simulation run. The probability distribution p of the underlying Monte Carlo design space (X, p) introduces the frequency with which such loss values occur. Accordingly, the risk R can be measured as the average of L(X).
Proposition 6 (Properties of Risk). a) For the simulation designX it holds mean(N (0)) = mean(N (t end )) + mean(D(t end )) = mean(N (t end )) + R b) R ≤ max(X N (0) ) + min(X N (0) ) /2 for a uniform probability distribution ofX N (0) in the simulation designX. c) R ≤ max(X N (0) ).
Proof. a) According to proposition 2.b), one gets N (0) = N (t end ) + D(t end ). Applying the operator mean to both sides of the equation and taking the linearity of mean into account, the definition of R gives the claimed statement. b) The risk is maximal, if the losses L are maximal, i.e. if no survivors occur. Thus, it holds mean(N (t end )) = 0 in this case. Furthermore, for a uniform probability distribution with upper and lower bounds max(X N (0) ), min(X N (0) ) it holds mean(N (0)) = max(X N (0) ) + min(X N (0) ) /2. The assertion is an immediate consequence. c) In the statement mean(N (0)) = mean(N (t end )) + R of part a), the risk R is maximal, if N (t end ) is minimal and N (0) maximal. For an arbitrary simulation designX, there may never be a survivor at the end. and the initial number N (0) of force elements may always be maximal indeed. Formally, this leads to N (t end ) = 0 and N (0) = max(X N (0) ). This gives the claim.
Of course, it is possible to define a chance C = mean(N (t end )) analogously to the risk R = mean(D(t end )). Due to proposition 6.a), C can then be calculated by C = mean(N (0)) − R. Since this gives no new essential information, we will discuss only the risk in the following.
Analysis of Model Behavior
Analysis of Scenario Classes
We will now analyze the statistics of outcomes for the scenario classes given in table 4. Concerning the initial conditions, we assume I(0) = 0, R(0) = 0, D(0) = 0. For the ranges of model parameters and the initial number of vulnerable elements it may hold in general:
The ranges may be subject to additional constraints in specific scenario classes; for details, see table 4. Though asymmetric cyber capabilities are more interesting for assessing the potential influence of these capabilities on the outcome, the symmetric cases 'kin' and 'pat' defined in table 4 provide reference points for comparisons. For 'kin', the equation system (3) is reduced to the pure Lanchester case described by (1) (for additional information about this case, see e.g. [28, 29] ). For 'pat', the characteristics introduced by setting both γ, γ to zero are more subtle. As stated before, force elements infected with malware typically have a reduced kinetic effectiveness. The setting γ = 0 represents the inability to patch an infected element for reestablishing the original fighting strength, i.e. these elements can not recover effectively. This means that the outflow of the compartment I is blocked. In phases without kinetic combat, the level of the compartment I will thus increase monotonically. As a supplement, the condition γ = 0 blocks the bypass of I through a direct flow from S to R. This increases the inflow to I indirectly, i.e. it increases the number of infected force elements and thus decreases the fighting capability further. It will thus be advantageous for the opposite force in this case to start the malware attack at the earliest possible time and in the strongest way possible. The earlier and the more intense the malware attack, the higher the level of infections and the higher the chances of a successful kinetic combat for the attacker. For allowing a concise assessment of the consequences of malware attacks, we supplement now kinetic equality by the notions of kinetic inferiority and kinetic superiority. Together, these notions partition the design space X in three disjoint subsets. In the following, we will discuss the properties of these subsets.
Definition (Kinetic Superiority and Kinetic Inferiority). Let g kin : X → X designate the mapping, which transforms a scenario x ∈ X to a corresponding scenario x ∈ X with x δ Ib = x δ Ir = 1 and x i = x i for all other components. In effect, the mapping g kin provides a pure kinetic scenario x resulting from x by hiding all malware effects. Then, Blue is designated as kinetic superior resp. kinetic inferior for a scenariox ∈X, if ∆N (g kin (x)) > 0 resp. < 0.
Kinetic superiority and inferiority make an individual handling advisable, because malware is used with fundamentally different intentions. In the case of superiority, malware serves purposes of risk reduction. In the case of inferiority, malware intends to change the winning side by compensating inferiority. This means formally, that Blue aims at ∆N (x) > 0 despite of ∆N (g kin (x)) < 0 for a given scenariox ∈X. Later in section 4.2, we will take a closer look at such changes due to modifications of the given scenario. Altogether, 7150 Monte-Carlo simulation runs were executed for each scenario class defined in table 4. Using a fixed step size of δt = 0.05, a simulation run was stopped as soon as the change of the value was smaller than 3.0 · 10 −4 for each compartment for at least 1/δt simulation steps.
Id
Parameter Settings 
Equality case Both sides are kinetically equal due to equality in force sizes, kinetic effectiveness, and Lanchester coefficients p, q Table 4 : List of scenario classes specifically discussed in the analysis. For a better overview, they are grouped in symmetric cases (both sides have the same capabilities) and asymmetric cases (some capabilities belong to one side only). As a special kind of symmetry, kinetic equality is considered. Asymmetric cases are mainly used for discussing the advantages resulting from malware attack and defense capabilities.
The numerical results can be found in the appendix in the tables 6 and 7 for the general case and the case of kinetical equality and in tables 8 and 9 for kinetical inferiority/superiority. Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the mean values of observables in the scenario classes defined in table 4. For kinetic superiority resp. inferiority, mean(∆N (X)) deviates significantly from classes without such an imbalance. The influence of kinetical superiority resp. inferiority on mean(∆D(X)) is slightly smaller. The risk R(X) representing the mean absolute number of losses is typically less influenced by superiority or inferiority than the mean relative number mean(∆D(X)) of losses. Kinetical equality increases the risk R(X) both for malware attack and defense situations to a level comparable to situations with kinetic inferiority. Contrary to kinetic inferiority, the higher risk for situations with kinetic equality is accompanied by a prolongation of the phases of kinetic combat as indicated by mean(∆T (X)).
Value distributions of ∆N are shown in figure 9 in the appendix. Complementary information about ∆N for kinetically superior and inferior forces can be found in figure 10 and about onesided attack and defense in figure 11 . Value distributions of the losses L are included in the figures 10 and 11 as well. As a final remark, we want to add that attack and (no-)defense situations are commonly similar.
One reason for this similarity may be that without malware attacks, there are also no defense actions (If there is no action, counteractions do not make sense). The first four groups display the results for situations with and without kinetic equality constraint for both cyber attack and cyber defense situations. The last four groups repeat these considerations for the cases of kinetic superiority and inferiority. Each group consists of the case without further constraints, the one-sided cyber capability case and the case without corresponding cyber capabilities. In all symmetric cases, mean(∆N ) ≈ 0 and mean(∆D) ≈ 0 due to the symmetry of (3). Accordingly, fighting out a combat for both sides not only at the kinetic but on the cyber level as well does not influence the chances of survival in the mean. If only the blue side supports its kinetic combat with a malware attack, mean(∆N ) is increased and mean(∆D) decreased. If only patching capabilities are limited to Blue (defense case), mean(∆N ) is only slightly increased. The value of mean(∆D) is decreased accordingly. The expected number of surviving force elements is considerably smaller than the expected number of killed force elements; this holds due to the fact, that the loosing side of a kinetic combat has no surviving force elements, whereas even the force of the winning side is reduced by a certain amount of elements destroyed in combat. The risk is reduced in the case of one-sided malware attacks or defenses.
Analysis of Scenario Class Changes
In the previous section, the statistics of the observables defined in table 3 is given for various scenario classes. The scenario classes are characterized by constraints on the parameter ranges, which are considered as being a part of the knowledge about the situation. Now we extend our considerations to changes of the actual situation. More precisely, we will look at improvements of the state of knowledge defining the scenario class and the effects of these improvements on the statistics of the observables. As already mentioned, we restrict ourselves here to such modifications of the state of knowledge, which leads to modified ranges of parameter domains. Aim is the assessment of the influence of scenario class modifications and thus modifications of the design space X on the outcomes. For realizing this approach, we have to compare a general scenario x ∈ X with a corresponding reference scenario x ∈ X ⊆ X. The corresponding modification of the input x is realized by applying a transformation mapping g : X → X ⊆ X. ). This can be diagramed as follows. For the analysis of the influence of knowledge modifications, we have used the same simulation runs as described in section 4.1. The numerical results of the analysis are represented in the tables 10 -13 in the appendix. We begin the analysis with a discussion of the influence of kinetic superiority or inferiority on the changes of the outcomes. Corresponding histograms of the behavior of mean(d ∆N ) and mean(d L b ) are given in figure 6 . For the transformation classes A2 and A3, adding cyber capabilities will increase the number of survivors especially for situations with kinetic inferiority. The effect for situations with kinetic superiority is significantly smaller. For the general case and kinetically equal forces, no significant effect can be observed for the cases A1 and D1 concerning mean(d ∆N ) or mean(d ∆D ). From the viewpoint of the absolut number L b of losses, the situation is different. The value of |d L b | is significantly larger for kinetically equal forces than for the general case. Figure 10 considers the value distributions of ∆N and of L b for kinetic superiority or inferiority without distinguishing different levels.
Concerning the behavior in the case of kinetic superiority resp. inferiority, figure 5 provides some supplementary information. An additional cyber capability for Blue (case A3) increases the losses especially for kinetically equal forces. For kinetic superiority resp. inferiority, the increase is larger resp. smaller than in the general case. Equalizing the red capabilities by adding a cyber capability to the red force as well (case A2) leads to a different behavior. Here, the number of losses will increase for Blue especially in the case of kinetic superiority. Of special interest are situations, in which the winning side changes due to the usage of malware. Such situations are considered in more detail in the figures 5, 7, 12. Whereas figure 5 gives mean values of the changes of the relative number ∆N of survivors and of the absolute number L b of losses for transitions between scenario classes, figure 12 in the appendix focuses more detailed on the influence of malware attacks on the value distributions of surviving and killed force elements. Accordingly, histograms of d ∆N and d L b are given for the transformation classes A1, A2, and A3 (see table 5 ). The data are presented with and without restriction to situations with a change of the winning side due to cyber combat support. All data indicate, as expected, that malware can turn around a situation in a significant number of situations. An especially large number of in table 5 . Below, the corresponding values for situations with a change of the winning side due to the transitions are given. The results are grouped according to the transformation classes A1, A2, A3, D1, D2, D3; each group covers the case without other constraints, the case of kinetically equal forces, and the cases of kinetic superiority resp. inferiority. Let us at first consider the general cases shown in the upper two charts. For A1 and D1, mean(d ∆N ) and mean(d L b ) is close to zero, whereas for A2/A3 resp. D2/D3 significant deviations can be observed. The different behavior is caused by the fact that both A1 and D1 describe transformations between symmetric cases, whereas A2, A3, D2, and D3 transforms symmetric to asymmetric cases and vice versa.
The mean values of the measures d ∆N , d L b restricted to situations with a change of the winning side are usually much more pronounced. For kinetically equal forces, this scale up of the values is smaller than in the other cases, however. No data are given for kinetically equal forces for the classes A1 and A3, since the original situation has an even outcome per definition. For kinetically superior (blue) forces in the case A3, which describes the addition of cyber capabilities to Blue, naturally no change of the winning side can be expected. winning changes are observed for one-sided capabilities (see figures 5 and 7). One effect of the changes of the winning side is the absolutely large value of the minimum and maximum of d ∆N and d ∆D (see tables 10 -13) . This indicates the possibility of a large decrease or increase of the corresponding observables.
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Influence of Dynamic Phenomena
In this paper, the model (3) is analyzed based on input-outcome relationships. This essentially abstracts from the dynamics of the model. For enabling a better understanding of the model behavior, at least an rudimentary look at the phenomena of the dynamical evolution of a situation seems to be helpful, however.
Since infected force elements may be subject to a reduction of kinetic effectiveness, a temporal coincidence of the peak of infection in a force and the phase of kinetic combat is advantageous for the opposing force. Timing of the cyber attack and parametrization of the malware have to be set accordingly. Choosing an attack time too early gives the enemy the option of patching and thus restoring the kinetic effectiveness of many force elements until kinetic combat starts, whereas a late start time of the malware attack does not yet have a significant influence on the kinetic combat due to the small number of infections taking place until t kin is reached. Let us consider some specific examples. An alignment of the malware infection peak with the phase of kinetic combat can be reached
A2 A3 Figure 6 : The charts show the dependence of the behavior of the system on the level of kinetic superiority or inferiority. For this purpose, the set of scenarios was partitioned in 10 classes depending on the value of ∆N for the associated pure Lanchester scenario. Scenarios with the strongest inferiority ∆N < −0.8 are shown at the outermost left in the histograms, the scenarios with the strongest superiority ∆N > 0.8 at the outermost right. In the first row, we show the mean values of ∆N , ∆T , and L b for general scenarios assuming symmetric cyber capabilities (i.e. scenario class 'gen'). Beyond that, the mean changes mean(d ∆N ), mean(d ∆T ), and mean(d L b ) for the transition classes A1, A2, A3 are given. The variation of ∆N across the inferiority and superiority classes corresponds to the definition of these classes; the antisymmetry w.r.t. ∆N = 0 is preserved. The additional usage of malware dampening the existing kinetic differences slightly, however, as is indicated by the behavior of mean(d ∆N ) for the class A1. The losses are substantially smaller for superior forces than for inferior forces. One has to note, that the highest losses do not occur for extreme inferiority, but for significant inferiority. This is caused by the fact that typically the initial number of force elements in the class of strongest inferiority is quite small, thus not leading to high losses. The additional usage of malware decreases the losses in the case of strong superiority, but will increase it in the case inferiority or weak superiority. The increase is caused by the overall reduction of kinetic effectiveness of force elements due to malware infections, which will level out inferiority and superiority to some degree. As a result, the losses on both sides will increase in many situations.
Fraction of Situations with Change of Winning Side
Fraction of Situations with Change of Winning Side with ∆T ≥ 50 The results are grouped according to the transformation classes A1, A2, A3, D1, D2, D3; each group covers the case without other constraints, the case of kinetically equal forces, and the cases of kinetic superiority resp. inferiority. No data are given for kinetically equal forces for the classes A1 and A3, since the considered transition starts with a scenario with an even outcome per definition. Thus, it does not make sense to talk about a change of the winning side here. In many cases indeed a turn around of the situation by changing the winning side occurs after additional usage of malware. Furthermore, in the case of long lasting kinetic battles usually a slightly higher fraction of turn-arounds can be observed. This means, malware is more effective in situations, in which it has more time to influence the outcome. For transition classes D1, D2, D3, which are related to defense capabilities against malware, the fraction of situations with a change of the winning side is typically smaller than for the classes A1, A2, and A3 related to the overall malware usage capability. This is caused by the more radical changes described by the transition classes A1, A2, A3.
by setting the value of the infection rate β appropriately. High infection rates are not always recommendable due to a maybe untimely peak of infections. Similarly, a prolongation of the duration ∆t m of a malware attack may sometimes have negative consequences as well. For the defending side, analogous paradoxa exist. Early countermeasures set into effect by choosing an appropriate ∆t p may sometimes be disadvantageous. The malware epidemics may be weakened, thus shifting the epidemics peak to later times. As a consequence, the peak of infections may now be located in the phase of kinetic combat causing a larger number of losses than before. At the cyber level, the co-occurring reduction of malware attack capabilities of the defenderonly vulnerable and patched force elements can execute a malware attack, but not infected force elements -is a back-effect on the attacker. The influence of the variation of some input parameters on the relative number ∆N of survivors is shown exemplary in figure 8 . The figure also shows the sometimes minor importance of the duration ∆t m of a malware attack. This supports the conjecture that an effective malware attack does not necessarily need to last long.
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Legend: The plots indicate the influence of the position t max Ir of the malware infection peak and the phase of kinetic combat relative to each other. This is done by showing the position of the time t max(Ir) (red line) at which the maximum number of infected force elements is reached, with start and end time t kin start , t kin end of kinetic combat (grey region). As can be seen, the change of input parameters may lead to shifts of the time t max(Ir) . The relationship is quite often nontrivial. Note that timing of countermeasures of Red has an influence as well. 21
Duration of Kinetic Combat
Numerical data about the duration ∆T of kinetic combat for different scenario classes are given in the tables 6 -9. For all scenario classes, the mean duration mean(∆T ) of kinetic combat is much smaller than the observed maximum duration max(∆T ). The minimum duration min(∆T ), on the other hand, is consistently close to zero. The comparatively large maxima result from situations with very slow dynamics caused by small kinetic effectiveness of both sides. In such a case it will take a long time until one force is annihilated ending the combat. In situations with a still slower dynamics, the simulation misinterprets the absence of significant changes of the force sizes as end of kinetic combat (or triggers even a stop of the whole simulation run). Since this may be done immediately after the start of kinetic combat, one gets min(∆T ) ≈ 0. Another reason for short-duration combats is a strong superiority or inferiority of one force leading to a victory or defeat within short time. Such situations indeed exist, as is indicated by the higher risk for kinetic combat with short duration. A short duration of the kinetic combat limits the influence of an eventual malware infection. Due to the short duration, the malware has typically not much time for being effective in combat (see figure 13 in the appendix). Furthermore, the probability that the malware infection reaches its peak (and thus its highest effectivity) in the phase of kinetic combat is smaller (look at the wandering of the peak of infection due to input parameter variation in figure 8 ).
The tables 10 -13 supplement the considerations about ∆T with information about the behavior of d ∆T . Figure 6 indicates in the case of kinetic equality that the usage of malware leads typically to a slightly prolonged kinetic combat, often due to reduced kinetic effectiveness of both sides as demonstrated in figure 6 . The equalization of the kinetic effectiveness of the two forces is another possible cause. In fact, the duration ∆T of kinetic combat is the longest for kinetically equal forces. With increasing degree of inferiority or superiority, the duration of kinetic combat decreases, whereby the duration decreases stronger in the case of superiority than in the case of inferiority. In figure 13 in the appendix, the tendency of an equalization of effectiveness by malware usage can be observed as a shift of the peak in the distribution of losses to higher values especially for short-duration kinetic combats. In some situations, however, the additional usage of malware reduces the duration significantly. In such cases, presumably the malware turns out to be effective for just one side. This will simultaneously shorten and intensify kinetic combat. Obviously, the effects enabling a faster decision of combat are stronger then than the prolongation of kinetic combat due to reduced kinetic effectiveness.
Outlook
Our Main Contributions
• Enabling comparisons between scenarios by simulation-based calculation of the secanrio outcomes and their quantitative assessment.
• Enabling absolute assessments of scenario outcomes by referring to their possible range.
• Analysis of various scenario classes under inclusion of uncertainties using Monte-Carlo simulations.
• Inclusion of knowledge and assumptions about the situation by information-theoretic principles.
• Automated model-based calculation of statistical scenario class properties like the risk.
• Determination of the changes of the outcomes after an update of the available knowledge.
• Demonstration of synergies resulting from a combined handling of availability and malware infections.
Analysis vs. Computation
The paper discusses the interactions between security and availability based on a model representing the effects of self-replicating malware propagating across force elements engaged in kinetic combat. The behavior of the model -especially the influence of malware on kinetic combatwas analyzed both analytically and computationally. In this way, synergies between analytical and computational methods could be exploited. The analytical part makes essential contributions for enabling a computational analysis under well-defined conditions and plays a decisive role in the interpretation of the results. The computational part, on the other hand, provides the calculation of the statistics of outcomes, which is done quantitatively based on Monte-Carlo simulations and can hardly be realized at the analytical level.
Abstraction Level of Model
Despite of the simplicity of the model, we have been able to gain new insight into the properties and behavior of a combined kinetic and cyber warfare model. This may be astonishing in view of the many missing details. Due to the many unknowns, the usability of a much more detailed model seems to be indeed questionable. Substantial details characterize a very specific situation. The probability for a future situation to coincide with these details becomes infinitesimally small. On the other hand, even highly detailed models may not reproduce all effects occurring in reality. A highly abstract model has decisive advantages. Besides of allowing an analytical handling, a simple model of small computational complexity assures a practical tractability of the large number of simulation runs, which are required for reaching a sufficiently dense coverage of the design space X. We have made use of two paradigms for gaining the necessary simplicity. First, we have chosen a system dynamics model (though with some extensions like an eventlike structure). Second, we have permitted descriptive modeling aspects like the inclusion of exponents p, q instead of insisting on purely explanatory models.
Synergies between Dependability Aspects
We have discussed the interplay between the availability of capabilities of force elements and a propagating malware infection. Whereas the malware reduces the kinetic effectiveness of a force impeding its capability to carry out kinetic combat, kinetic capabilities will restrict in turn both malware attack and patching capabilities of the enemy. Effects of the malware on the availability can be determined directly by quantifying the outcome of the kinetic combat with and without usage of malware. The availability perspective, on the other hand, can be used to give the malware infection a 'meaning' beyond the rudimentary observation whether an infection exists or not. In this way our considerations show the strengths of the domain of dependability, which discusses various secondary 3 system properties (availability, reliability, safety, security, maintainability, . . .) in a combined way. The advantage consists of taking interactions and trade-offs between the secondary properties into account. Accordingly, the approach presented in this paper is also related to the unified simulation-based risk assessment concept for safety and security suggested in [5, 6] . Whereas malware aspects belong to the domain of security, the notion of availability is related to both safety and security. Though appealing from the theoretical point of view, a practical realization of an 'exact' simulation-based risk assessment is impeded often by the very high computational complexity of such an algorithm. This complexity results from the simulation of the various options of system evolutions for determining the contributions of these branches to the overall risk in a brute-force way. Maybe the principle of a knowledge-based selection of representative scenarios provides a viable option for the approximation of the precise value of the risk in this more complex context as well. The idea is to restrict the simulation runs to a limited number of appropriate evolution branches, whereby the representativeness of the contributions of these branches to the risk has to be assured by corresponding system properties. Monte-Carlo simulation based risk assessments are already successfully applied to e.g. the assessment of project risks [19] .
Future Research
The semi-automatization achieved by the implementation of a model-based computational analysis process can be used to analyze the differences between various attack methods, infection mechanisms, propagation pathways, and countermeasures. Furthermore, it enables the experimentation with the consequences of different knowledge (or assumptions) about the situation. In our paper the considerations are limited to the most simple constraints leading to uniform probability distributions for the design space. The full vision would be to run a maximum-entropy algorithm for defining probabilities of scenario selection for much more general constraints and knowledge fragments. Another opportunity for future research is a closer look at the underlying dynamics. Our experiments have shown that the timing of actions and countermeasures may influence the outcome significantly.
For optimizing the utilization of malware, the peak of the malware infection presumably has to be aligned with the phase of kinetic combat. Furthermore, the characteristics of malware propagation and of the force elements have to be adapted to each other. It would be interesting to discuss the improvements possible by such an optimization of the malware utilization.
All Kinetic Situations
Kinetically Equal Situations
General Situations
One-Sided Attack
One-Sided Defense For kinetic inferiority, the situation is similar; situations with a number of blue survivors close to zero are less frequent however. This difference can be detected in the distribution of losses L b as well. On the whole, for kinetic superiority a low number of losses is much more frequent than a high number with a monotonic decline. In the case of kinetic inferiority, the peak of the frequency is shifted to slightly higher values as one may have expected.
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∆N
∆D L b
One-Sided Attack Superiority Inferiority One-Sided Defense Superiority Inferiority Figure 11 : Value distributions of ∆N , ∆D, and L b = D b (t end ) given for one-sided cyber attacks and one-sided cyber defense capabilities. The data are split up for the cases of kinetic superiority and inferiority of Blue.
In the case of kinetic inferiority, a one-sided cyber attack can very well turn around the situation as indicated by non-vanishing frequencies for ∆N ≥ 0. The situation of a one-sided defense essentially resembles the one of one-sided attacks, but is less pronounced. Whereas for kinetic superiority with or without one-sided cyber attacks a win is assured (i.e. ∆N ≥ 0), one-sided capabilities of cyber defense will not exclude outcomes with ∆N < 0. This means, the opponent may be able to turn around the situation. The relative number ∆D of losses behaves analogously to ∆N , though of course ∆N > 0 is related to ∆D < 0 and vice versa. Since even a convincing win is usually associated with some losses, the value distribution of ∆D is typically less pronounced than ∆N . In the case of kinetic superiority, the opposing force suffers still the majority of losses. For kinetic inferiority, however, the value distribution of ∆D already becomes roughly symmetric, though a significant shift towards ∆D > 0 prevails. The correspondence between ∆N and ∆D can be extended to the distribution of absolute losses L b . As already indicated in the text, a small value of L b is much more frequent than a high value in general. The observed decline is typically monotonic. In the case of kinetic inferiority, however, the peak of the frequency is shifted to slightly higher values.
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All Situations
Situations with Change of Winning Side Since the effectiveness of malware presumably influences the duration of kinetic combat, we take a look at the value distributions of the relative number of survivors ∆N (left column) and the absolute number of losses L b (right column). This is done for short (∆T < 50) and long (∆T ≥ 50) kinetic combats, whereby the distinction between a short and a long duration is done for both the corresponding pure Lanchester situation and the combined kinetic/cyber case. In general, a long duration of kinetic combat leads to a higher frequency of values of ∆N close to zero, i.e. of situations with an even outcome. For short durations, in the contrary, values of ∆N far away from zero are more prominent. Since for long lasting kinetic combats a low number of losses is more frequent than a high number, the prevalence of even outcomes must not be compulsory interpreted as mutual annihilation of both forces. Ineffectiveness of the forces leading to a stop of simulation due to a faded dynamics is considered as preferable explanation. For short durations, in the contrary, the peak of losses is shifted towards higher values interpretable as higher intensity of the kinetic combats than usual. Table 9 : The table summarizes the behavior of the observables ∆N , ∆D, ∆T as well as the risk R for the three basic cases of model behavior concerning malware defense. The three basic cases are the general system, situations with one-sided malware recovery, and situations without recovery for both sides. We give corresponding values for Blue as kinetic superior as well as inferior force. A short discussion of these data can be found in section 4.1.
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